1. Introduction

Countries create international organisations (IOs) to address complex issues that transcend national boundaries and require collective action to achieve results that individual states cannot achieve alone.

IOs offer a structured forum where states can pool their resources, expertise, and political will, amplify the voices and influence of less powerful nations on global issues, and foster collective action to address common challenges. Also, IO streamline international cooperation by reducing the costs and complexities of negotiations, enforcement, and compliance, making multilateral collaboration more effective than individual or bilateral efforts.

For IOs to have a strong value proposition to their member states, they need to address clearly and narrowly defined problems that resonate deeply with member states’ core national interests. A widely and genuinely accepted IO’s value proposition by member states is likely to engender a robust member state’s commitment and enhance the sustainability and impact of IOs. Therefore, it is not only crucial that IOs have a well-defined problem(s) they intend to solve but must also ensure that the problem statement is closely aligned with member states’ core interests and widely recognised by them.

The degree of involvement and significance that member states ascribe to the decision-making procedures within an IO could be taken as indicators of the importance they consider the IO’s function and how it may impact their core interests. The complex nature of these decision-making structures and the meticulousness with which they are executed could demonstrate the extent to which the states depend on the IO to influence consequential results consistent with their core national objectives. It is, therefore, reasonable to argue that the precise assessment of an IO’s significance and impact on its members may be unveiled through the transparency, complexities and seriousness of its decision-making frameworks.

This is so because when member states recognise the inherent value of IOs, they are more likely to prioritise decision-making frameworks and structures within IOs. The attention given by member states to the governance of decision-making within IOs is crucial for several reasons. Firstly, the rules set the tone for individual states’ influence over organisational outcomes. Secondly, the decision-making process directly impacts members’ adherence to the outcomes. Lastly, the framework reflects the IO’s representativeness, responsiveness, legitimacy, and effectiveness.

This opinion piece contends that decision-making protocols within the African Union (AU) should be part of the ongoing reforms of the AU because the AU’s predominant preference for consensus-based decision-making, despite its alignment with prevailing trends in IOs, may be at the heart of the challenges facing the AU, including a lack of clear and narrow value proposition, dispersed focus, funding shortages, and widespread non-compliance with its decisions.

This blog is not an academic exercise and does not present tested conclusions; instead, it relies on studies of decision-making in other IOs to substantiate its claims. Its goal is to spark discussion within the context of the ongoing AU reforms, particularly on strategies to incentivise member states to finance the Union and take its decisions seriously and adequately.
2. Decision-making within the African Union

The AU is an association of 55 member states. Its mandate includes promoting economic integration, peace and security, democratic governance, human rights, and development across the continent and fostering African solidarity and common positions on global issues. Within this mandate, the AU has spearheaded numerous initiatives to address collective security concerns, such as deploying peace support operations and mediating conflicts. It also works towards economic integration through the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), which aims to create a single African market for goods and services.

The AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government is the highest decision-making Organ within the Union. According to Rule 18 of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly of the Union:

1. The Assembly shall take all its decisions by consensus or, failing which, by a two-thirds majority of the Member States eligible to vote.
2. Decisions on questions of procedure shall be taken by a simple majority of Member States eligible to vote.
3. Decisions on whether or not a question is one of procedure shall also be determined by a simple majority of the Member States eligible to vote.
4. Abstentions by Member States eligible to vote shall not prevent the Assembly from adopting decisions by consensus.

Thus, the AU’s highest decision-making organ on substantive issues, the Assembly, prioritises achieving consensus when making decisions. If consensus cannot be reached, a decision requires a two-thirds majority vote from the member states eligible to vote.

3. The historical roots of consensus decision-making

Consensus decision-making in IOs is a method where decisions are approved without formal objections or votes. It occurs when no delegation formally opposes the consensus, even if reservations about the matter exist. Rooted in the principle of sovereign equality, it ensures that all states—regardless of size or power—have an equal voice in the decision-making process, allowing for decisions to be made with the broadest agreement possible.

The consensus method fosters cooperation and unity. Requiring the agreement of all or most parties prevents any single member or group of members from imposing their will on others, thus promoting a sense of joint ownership of the outcomes. In essence, it is meant to embody a democratic and egalitarian approach to international governance.

However, this system has faced criticism for allowing more powerful states to wield undue influence behind the scenes. While formally all states have an equal voice, in practice, certain states’ economic, military, and diplomatic clout can lead to a de facto weighted or veto system. These powerful states may influence decisions through informal channels, such as lobbying, offering incentives, or threatening repercussions for non-cooperation. As such, while decisions are presented as unanimous or consensual, they may reflect the interests of the most influential members more than those of the less powerful states.

This critique suggests that consensus decision-making, while promoting equality and unanimity, can obscure the power dynamics at play. The powerful states’ ability to influence outcomes can undermine the integrity of the consensus process, leading to decisions that favour their interests over the collective good or the interests of smaller or less powerful nations.

Such practices can potentially diminish the legitimacy of the international organisation, as they raise questions about whose interests are indeed being served. For this reason, some argue that international decision-making processes should be more transparent and reflect the actual power dynamics among states, potentially through mechanisms like weighted voting that openly acknowledge the disproportionate influence of certain countries. Such an approach could lead to a more realistic and functional system that balances the need for unity and cooperation with the reality of unequal power distribution among states.

Saying that the consensus system has challenges does not mean that the weighted or veto system is without challenges. Weighted or veto voting procedures in IOs have their own sets of challenges. Frequently, these systems reinforce disparities, bestowing an imbalanced amount of authority to dominant nations while marginalising weaker ones. Sometimes, a weighted voting system results in inaction when veto rights are employed to obstruct agreement. Furthermore, weighted voting systems have the potential to establish and maintain an unequal distribution of power, reduce collaboration among member states, and undermine the organisation’s credibility if the decision-making process is seen as unjustly favouring certain parties.

Within a weighted or vetoed system, countries may engage in strategic actions to use their power for personal advantage, which can fracture unity and encourage the formation of contentious alliances. Furthermore, less influential states (often in the majority) may feel detached from the decisions made by IOs. They may be less motivated to implement these decisions, resulting in less overall compliance and diminished organisational efficacy. The consolidation of power within a small group can transform these organisations into environments that only amplify the viewpoints and agendas of the most influential governments, weakening the original communal objectives they intended to fulfil.

4. Transparency vs power dynamics within the AU

The AU prioritised consensus decision-making due to the downsides of the weighted or voted decision-making systems mentioned above. By prioritising consensus, the AU’s decision-making process aims to uphold the principle of sovereign equality, where each member state has an equal say, regardless of its economic size, population, or military might. This framework is intended to protect the sovereignty of each member by ensuring that no decision is taken without their agreement, theoretically giving each state veto power. Hopefully, this consensus approach could foster a cooperative spirit within the AU, as it requires discussions, negotiations, and compromise to reach widely acceptable decisions.

However, this method also has drawbacks that can hinder the AU’s efficacy and objectives. One such drawback is inefficiency. Reaching a consensus can be time-consuming, requiring extensive dialogue to achieve unanimous agreement. In situations requiring swift action, such as political crises or humanitarian interventions, the need for consensus can lead to delays that exacerbate the problem. Also, the quest for unanimity may force the AU to settle for the lowest common denominator in policy-making, which can dilute the effectiveness of decisions and the overall legitimacy of the Union. When all states must agree or offer no formal objection to a decision, the resultant policies may be watered down to avoid objection, potentially leading to outcomes that lack the necessary strength or specificity to be impactful.

Another critical concern, as pointed out by scholars, is that the consensus-based approach may mask the actual power dynamics within the organisation. Due to their more significant diplomatic influence, economic clout, or strategic significance, powerful states may informally steer discussions and influence the consensus to align with their interests. This informal power exercise can happen through bilateral agreements, promises of development aid, trade deals, or other means of exerting pressure or persuasion.

Thus, while the decision might be presented as a product of unity and collective will, it could be heavily influenced by a few powerful member states, which undermines transparency and accountability, as the informal mechanisms of influence are not part of the official decision-making record, and can reinforce the very power imbalances the consensus method seeks to prevent.

In this light, some scholars critique consensus decision-making as a move towards opacity in the guise of unanimity. Allowing power dynamics to operate behind the scenes can make the process less transparent and less accountable to the broader membership and the citizens of member states. For the AU, rethinking the balance between the need for unity, effectiveness, and transparency could be key to its future role as an important actor in steering and governing African integration and an influential voice in global governance.

5. Revisiting the AU’s decision-making framework

It may be necessary for the AU, as part of the ongoing reform process, to reform its decision-making mechanisms to include a weighted voting system. The proposal is that the AU’s decision-making processes should consist of a dual voting power and membership system. This proposal is in response to the challenges posed by the existing consensus model. The suggested dual system aims to balance member states’ need for equality and sovereignty with the practicalities of efficiency and the recognition of state member’s power distribution and contributions.

Under the current consensus system, all member states have equal decision-making power on all agenda items, which can lead to inefficiency and the covert exertion of influence by more powerful states. The proposed system seeks to mitigate these issues by introducing a mechanism that acknowledges member states’ contributions in a more tangible, transparent and accountable way by incorporating weighted voting and traditional membership-based decision-making.

Weighted voting would give countries that contribute more to the AU’s core financial or other functions a proportionally more significant influence on certain decisions. This influence would manifest in the ability to exercise ‘visible’ veto powers. The specifics of such a system would need careful calibration to decide the weight each state holds, which could be based on their financial contributions, economic size, democratic credentials, compliance records with AU decisions, or other relevant criteria.

Unlike the United Nations Security Council veto system, the proposed AU system should be open to any AU member state willing and able to meet agreed-upon criteria. The ‘open-list’ aspect of this system is crucial. It ensures that any member state can increase its decision-making weight by meeting the established criteria, such as a higher level of funding for the AU’s budget. This maintains a democratic spirit, not excluding any member from attaining more significant influence through increased contributions.

Such a system introduces a transparent structure where the cost of wielding significant decision-making power, like a veto, is clear and quantifiable. It prevents the informal and opaque exertion of power that can occur under pure consensus systems, thus increasing accountability. Moreover, by tying veto power to explicit and measurable contributions, it aims to encourage member states to invest more in the Union, potentially strengthening the AU’s capabilities and resources.

This approach does raise questions about the traditional principle of state equality. Critics might argue that it could create a hierarchy among member states, undermining the very equality that the AU and other international organisations were built upon. However, proponents of the dual system would argue that it introduces a fair and equitable form of inequality, where additional influence must be earned and can be attained by any member willing to make the necessary contribution.

This proposed revision to the AU’s decision-making process strives to create a more dynamic and responsive institution. By adapting the organisation’s structures to the realities of its members’ existing power distribution, engagement, and contributions, the AU could become more effective in achieving its objectives and more representative of its members’ commitments.

This piece is not making or masking any radical rethinking of how the AU makes decisions and how this affects its members’ commitment. The argument is that the current consensus decision-making model is a de facto weighted veto system, where power dynamics are not officially acknowledged, and therefore, there is no explicit cost associated with exerting influence.

For the AU, adopting a transparent system where decision-making power is explicitly linked to members’ contributions could remedy the opaqueness of the current consensus approach. This transparency would clarify how and why certain decisions are made, aligning the formal decision-making structure with the real politics that often influences outcomes. The idea is that when the rules of influence are transparent and based on quantifiable contributions, such as funding or participation in AU programs, they are more likely to be followed, leading to higher compliance and more vigorous enforcement of AU decisions. But importantly, Africans can also call out AU member states for their decisions based on official records of such decisions.

The proposed dual system would be transparent about the weighted nature of decision-making, assigning veto power in a way that is directly proportional to the contributions made by member states. By doing so, it recognises the additional responsibilities and interests of those who contribute more significantly to the functioning of the AU while allowing any member state to attain similar influence through increased contributions.

This approach upholds democratic principles by ensuring that increased influence must be earned and is open to all rather than being the exclusive purview of a select few. It attaches a precise ‘cost’ to exercising a veto, making the exertion of power a matter of policy rather than behind-the-scenes negotiations. This results in a more engaged membership, as states see a direct link between their support of the AU and their ability to influence its direction.

6. Strategic implications for AU’s future

In a broader context, this proposed reform is about the AU’s adaptability and relevance in the contemporary international system. By aligning its decision-making structure with the contributions and influence of its members, the AU reaffirms its commitment to unity but also acknowledges the need for effective and responsive governance. This duality of purpose—maintaining unity while adapting to new challenges—is critical for the AU as it seeks to remain a vital player on the African continent and globally.

In summary, one possible advantage of the proposal to reform the existing decision-making procedures within the AU is that if power within the AU is proportional to the weight of members’ votes, there may be an incentive for members to take the AU more seriously, maybe because:

 Members who know that increased contributions will result in greater decision-making power have a clear incentive to contribute more. This is particularly compelling for states that wish to have more influence over AU’s policies and directions.
 When the rules are transparent about the relationship between contributions and voting power, states can make informed decisions about their level of engagement. This transparency might encourage states to invest more in the organisation.
 States may perceive a weighted voting system as more equitable because it recognises and rewards members’ contributions. Countries that contribute more financially or in terms of resources may feel that their efforts are somewhat acknowledged, leading them to sustain or increase their support.
 Weighted voting can lead to greater ownership among the most invested members. When a state knows its contributions lead to a corresponding influence, it will likely feel more responsible for the organisation’s successes and failures, leading to proactive engagement.
 By being more responsive to the needs and interests of its leading contributors through weighted voting power, the AU might, in turn, motivate members to increase their investment to ensure their priorities are addressed.
 While consensus can lead to gridlock, a weighted system can streamline decision-making processes. Members may be more willing to contribute if they feel the organisation can make efficient and effective decisions.
 The opportunity to gain influence could lead to competitive dynamics among member states, encouraging them to ‘out-contribute’ one another, thus increasing overall contributions to the AU.
 Members might be more willing to contribute to specific programs or initiatives if they believe they can have more say in allocating resources, ensuring their interests are directly served.
 Larger contributions for more voting power can be seen as a strategic investment for member states, as it might grant them leverage in shaping the agenda and future of the organisation in a way that aligns with their long-term strategic interests.
 A weighted voting system can mitigate the risks associated with the decision-making process by ensuring that those with the most at stake have corresponding control over decisions.

Author

Dr Remember Miamingi is a co-founder and CEO of Integrate Africa Advisory Services and a former advisor to the African Union’s Political Affairs, Peace, and Security Department.

Dr Miamingi is a graduate of Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, Osun State, Nigeria, and holds a Master of Laws and Doctor of Laws degree from the University of Pretoria, Pretoria, South Africa.

About Integrate Africa Advisory Services

Integrate Africa Advisory Services (IAAS) is a leading pan-African consulting firm headquartered in Johannesburg, South Africa. We assemble a team of African experts, strategists, political and policy analysts, researchers, and communicators, each with significant government and diplomatic experience and specialised knowledge in African integration. Our diverse expertise allows us to offer tailored advisory, research, and contracting services in African Union laws and policies, peace and security, economic integration, and geopolitical strategies.

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