The African integration project stands at a perilous crossroads. The inability to reintegrate three member states into the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has shocked the continent, fuelling fears of broader fragmentation and eroding trust in Africa’s key institutions responsible for the governance of its integration. While ECOWAS has responded with maturity, the precedent set by three member states raise a crucial question: what will prevent other disgruntled countries, within ECOWAS or other Regional Economic Communities (RECs) from following suit? If these states can leave a major REC without grave consequences, the integrity of other RECs and even the African Union (AU itself, is at risk, especially if the breakaway nations demonstrate a more successful model of integration.

The formalisation of this “divorce” within ECOWAS is just one symptom of the eroding f confidence in Africa’s subregional and regional integration frameworks. Another telling symptom is the slow pace at which member states honour their financial obligations, leaving these institutions chronically underfunded and reliant on external donors. This dependency, fuels concerns that donors wield disproportionate influence over policy decisions, leading to a perceived legitimacy deficit. Consequently, it may also explain why some member states increasingly disregard or selectively implement subregional and regional directives, exposing a widening gap between formal commitments and on the ground practice.

The lack of adequate and decisive subregional and regional leadership in addressing pressing security challenges, such as those in the Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes region, reinforces the perception   that these institutions are neither willing nor able to confront the continent’s key problems – raising key questions about their value propositions. Weak responses to security and governance crises like the long-running tensions between Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo or the outsourced management of the conflict in the Sudan and the tension between Ethiopia and Somalia situation have, damaged the Union’s credibility and fuelled perceptions that subregional and regional bodies in their current forms and functions are drifting into irrelevance.

Meanwhile, contradictory approaches to sanctioning military coups, contrasted with inaction toward democratic ‘elected’ governments that habitually ignore or manipulate constitutions and undermine democratic norms, have alienated many Africans. These factors raise the unsettling question of whether the African institutions genuinely serve the people’s interests or are hampered by the self-interests of Africa’s leaders, inertia and external pressures.

While the AU has repeatedly proposed reforms, these efforts remain primarily cosmetic, focusing on cost reductions and administrative adjustments rather than tackling fundamental questions about the nature and scope of integration in Africa. Critical issues remain unresolved: the pooling of certain sovereign powers, the creation of structures with powers and resources to enforce continental policies, a more precise definition of continental public goods, the adoption of sustainable funding models that consolidate the multiple membership fees paid by states to subregional and regional institutions, reducing duplication and financial strain, and clarity over subsidiarity and the margin of appreciation between and among the AU, RECs and member states. Rather than reimagining how to build a truly capable and legitimate Union, reform has stalled at technical fixes, leaving the underlying problems and doubts about the AU’s effectiveness firmly intact.

The AU must initiate a broad and inclusive dialogue on its future to prevent further disintegration. This dialogue must not be confined to heads of state rubber-stamping resolutions. Meaningful participation from RECs, civil society, diaspora communities, private-sector leaders, women’s organisations, and youth representatives is essential to forging a path toward an African integration project that reflects the aspirations of its people and delivers tangible results and healthy debates on an Africa we want and an Africa we deserve. Lofty promises, technical jargon, and delayed action plans will only deepen scepticism.

Such dialogues must revisit, more concretely, Kagame’s proposition on narrowing the Union’s agenda to a few high-impact policy initiatives with continental implications and aligning and consolidating continental structures around these narrow Priorities. Instead of stretching limited resources across numerous policy arenas, the AU should focus on four essential public goods—governance, peace and security, continental integration and development, and global representation—while embedding a robust framework for subsidiarity and margin of appreciation. For example, the AU and regional bodies could each segregate and share responsibilities as follows:

This example of subsidiarity arrangements could ensure that national governments, subregional bodies, and the continental organisation each exercise authority and discretion where they are best equipped to act. By limiting its scope, the AU can move beyond grand ambition and rebuild trust through tangible progress in key but narrowly limited areas.

Despite the warning signs, the fracture of Africa’s integration efforts is not inevitable. Suppose leaders act decisively to address bad governance, superficial reforms, dwindling funding, and weak implementation of regional decisions. In that case, the African integration project can still reset its course and deliver meaningful benefits to African citizens.

The lesson from the recent ECOWAS breakaway is clear: Disillusioned members and citizens may walk away when regional institutions fail to deliver tangible gains. For the AU, genuine renewal demands action-oriented, inclusive dialogues on fundamental reforms, redefining benchmarks for integration and investing in a core set of public goods so every member sees real value in remaining. Whether the AU treats this episode of ‘divorce’ within ECOWAS as a catalyst for transformation or allows it to become a precursor to further exits will determine the trajectory of African unity for future generations.

Author

Dr Remember Miamingi is a co-founder and CEO of Integrate Africa Advisory Services and a former advisor to the African Union’s Political Affairs, Peace, and Security Department.

Dr Miamingi is a graduate of Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, Osun State, Nigeria, and holds a Master of Laws and Doctor of Laws degree from the University of Pretoria, Pretoria, South Africa.

About Integrate Africa Advisory Services

Integrate Africa Advisory Services (IAAS) is a leading pan-African consulting firm headquartered in Johannesburg, South Africa. We assemble a team of African experts, strategists, political and policy analysts, researchers, and communicators, each with significant government and diplomatic experience and specialised knowledge in African integration. Our diverse expertise allows us to offer tailored advisory, research, and contracting services in African Union laws and policies, peace and security, economic integration, and geopolitical strategies.

IAAS aims to empower Africans, African organisations, pan-African institutions, African Union member states, and international organisations. We aim to help them anticipate, prepare for, respond to, and adapt their engagement strategies to maximise the opportunities and mitigate the risks associated with African integration.