In 2025, the UN Security Council adopted 24 resolutions explicitly under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the provisions that authorize sanctions, binding mandates, and the use of force. Eighteen of them concerned Africa. Not one African state had a permanent say in their adoption. Two decades after African governments set out their demand for permanent seats in the Ezulwini Consensus, that imbalance remains the most powerful argument for reforming the Council. Few governments now contest it.
Yet the argument Africa has won is the easier one. The harder question is what happens on the day it succeeds. If the Charter were amended tomorrow, two African states would acquire permanent seats in Africa’s name. Which two? Who would instruct their ambassadors at three in the morning, when a draft resolution on a coup in a neighboring capital lands without warning? What would happen if a resolution concerned one seat-holder’s own troops, or its largest creditor? And if the continent objected to how its seats were being used, what could it actually do?
The honest answer to most of these questions is that no one has publicly decided. That silence carries a risk African governments have been slow to confront. If the rules governing Africa’s permanent seats are written after the seats are allocated, the states that win them will be in a position to shape, and to limit, their own accountability. Africa is ready to sit at the Council’s top table. It is not yet ready to answer for how it would sit there. The moment to close that gap is now, while the seats are still a demand rather than a possession.
THE ARGUMENT ALREADY WON
Africa’s case rests on facts few dispute. Its 54 UN member states make up 28 percent of the General Assembly, the largest regional group. Its population of some 1.5 billion will account for roughly one in four people on earth by 2050. African soldiers and police fill the ranks of UN peacekeeping; in September 2025, Rwanda was the world’s second-largest contributor of uniformed personnel. In 2024, UN member states adopted the Pact for the Future, which commits them to “redress the historical injustice against Africa as a priority” and to treat the continent as “a special case.”
The major powers have moved, too. In September 2024, Washington announced support for two permanent African seats, though not for extending the veto to them. In May 2026, the United Kingdom told the Council that it “supports permanent representation for Africa, alongside permanent seats for Brazil, Germany, India, and Japan.” The same month, at a summit in Nairobi co-hosted by France, the chair of the African Union Commission welcomed French support for the AU’s reform model. China’s 2024 declaration with its African partners pledged support for special arrangements to meet Africa’s aspirations as a priority.
But endorsement is not a bargain. Washington’s 2024 position belongs to the previous administration. The current one has not publicly repudiated it, but neither has it championed it; its UN agenda has been dominated by cost cutting, including a roughly 15 percent cut to the organization’s regular budget that its ambassador highlighted to the Senate in April 2026. London links African seats to permanent seats for the so-called G4: Brazil, Germany, India, and Japan, whose candidacies are opposed by the Uniting for Consensus coalition, which includes Italy, Pakistan, Argentina, and South Korea. Beijing’s support for Africa sits alongside its long resistance to a permanent seat for Japan. Each endorsement, in other words, comes attached to a different package.
Every package must clear Article 108 of the Charter: adoption by two-thirds of the General Assembly and ratification by two-thirds of UN members, including all five permanent members. With 193 members, both thresholds stand at 129. Africa’s 54 votes are indispensable but insufficient. The continent needs 75 more, and the governments that cast them will be asking, consciously or not, what kind of permanent members Africa would produce.
WHAT PERMANENCE DEMANDS
It is tempting to answer that question by measuring Africa against the five permanent members. That would be a mistake of both law and history. Article 23 of the Charter simply names the five. It sets no economic, military, or democratic threshold for permanent membership; the criteria it lists, contribution to international peace and security and equitable geographical distribution, govern the election of non-permanent members. Nor did nuclear weapons qualify the original five. The Charter was signed in June 1945, before the first American atomic test; the other four powers acquired nuclear arms between 1949 and 1964. The five keep their seats because the Charter entrenches them, not because they continually prove themselves indispensable, let alone law-abiding. A readiness test applied to Africa and to no one else would be an entrance examination set by incumbents who never sat one.
The incumbents are also too unequal to serve as a template. In 2025, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, U.S. military spending of $954 billion was 14 times that of France. The five’s assessed shares of the UN regular budget for 2025–27 range from 22 percent for the United States to 2.094 percent for Russia. What they share is not a scale of power but a set of functions. Each has a capital that can instruct its ambassador within hours. Each has a diplomatic service able to engage on every file, from North Korea to the Sahel; in the Lowy Institute’s 2024 count, each maintained between 225 and 274 posts abroad. Each has the resources to sustain that engagement, independent means of assessing the facts it votes on, and enough weight to help implement, or obstruct, what the Council decides.
Those functions, not the incumbents’ arsenals, are the right yardstick, and they must be applied at the right level. Two African states would hold the seats, but they would hold them on behalf of a continental system. Africa’s readiness is therefore the readiness of three things together: the states that would sit, the AU machinery that would support and instruct them, and the commitments binding the two.
WHERE AFRICA STANDS
Measured this way, Africa is further along than skeptics assume and less far along than its own declarations imply.
Diplomatic craft is its clearest strength. The three elected African members of the Council have become a disciplined negotiating bloc. According to Security Council Report, they issued 105 joint statements in 2024, up from 16 in 2019, increasingly alongside Caribbean partners and on files beyond Africa. In 2023, Gabon, Ghana, and Mozambique drove the negotiation of Resolution 2719, which opened a route to financing AU-led peace operations through UN assessed contributions. In July 2025, the AU’s Peace and Security Council adopted a manual governing how it guides African Council members and receives their reports. Africa would not enter the permanent ranks as an apprentice.
Political direction is more developed than critics claim but less transparent than it should be. In February 2026, the AU Assembly endorsed an African reform model, presented by Africa’s negotiators in New York as a Council of at least 26 seats, and recorded a strategic roadmap reserved for the Committee of Ten heads of state that leads on the file. The core position is unchanged since 2005: at least two permanent seats with all the prerogatives of current members, including the veto if it is retained; five non-permanent seats; and selection of Africa’s representatives by the AU. Ezulwini even named the considerations for selection: the representative nature and capacity of those chosen. What has never been made public is how those considerations would be applied, who would apply them, and what the chosen states would owe the continent afterward.
Resources are the weakest link. Africa’s combined military spending in 2025 was $58.2 billion, less than France’s alone, although spending says little about deployable capability. What matters for a Council member is reliable access to mediators, civilian experts, police, logistics, and money under agreed authority. The AU’s Peace Fund held about $400 million in February 2026, and the AU Executive Council has endorsed raising its capitalization target to $1 billion. That is a real asset, but an endowment is not an operating budget, and no African government has publicly costed what it would take to staff and sustain a permanent seat. Technological independence is at an earlier stage still. The African Space Agency, inaugurated in Cairo in April 2025, is an institutional milestone, not yet a source of satellite imagery, cyber attribution, or verified intelligence for African diplomats who must weigh evidence supplied by others.
Capacity, finally, is not the same as conduct. In the same year that Rwanda ranked among the largest peacekeeping contributors, the Security Council unanimously demanded that Rwandan forces stop supporting the M23 rebels and withdraw from Congolese territory. Any credible African selection process must weigh both records. Troop numbers cannot buy immunity from scrutiny.
THE SEAT AND ITS MASTERS
The phrase “an African seat” conceals a choice Africa has not yet made. There are three possible designs, and they lead to different places.
The first would give the AU itself a seat. That would require a specially drafted Charter amendment defining an organization’s status, vote, and responsibilities in a body built for states. It is not legally impossible, but it is the hardest design to negotiate, and it would invite the European Union and others to demand the same.
The second would name two African states as permanent members in the amended Charter. This fits the Council’s existing structure and gives the holders durable authority. But it would turn the seats into national property. Once a state is written into the Charter, no AU decision could remove or replace it.
The third would reserve two permanent seats for Africa while allowing the AU to designate, and redesignate, the states that occupy them. This separates the permanence of Africa’s allocation from the tenure of any one government. It offers genuine accountability, but it requires explicit Charter rules on designation, replacement, and continuity, and it obliges Africa to explain how renewable occupancy squares with its demand for full and equal permanent membership.
The most achievable path is the second design, strengthened by a binding continental compact: two state-held seats, selected by the AU, carrying treaty obligations to consult, report, share costs, and explain any departure from common African positions. Europe offers a working precedent. Article 34(2) of the Treaty on European Union requires EU members on the Council to concert with their partners and to “defend the positions and the interests of the Union,” without prejudice to their responsibilities under the UN Charter. France’s seat remains French. The precedent shows that national membership can coexist with regional obligation. It does not show that it guarantees regional control.
That limit must be stated plainly, because African diplomacy has tended to blur it. An AU compact cannot bind the General Assembly, amend the Charter, or invalidate a Council vote. If permanent membership is vested in named states, the AU can review, censure, and withdraw political support, but it cannot recall. If African governments regard the power to replace a delinquent seat-holder as non-negotiable, they must fight for the third design and accept that it is harder to win. What Africa cannot do is promise national permanence to the winners and continental revocability to everyone else. That contradiction must be resolved before candidates are named. Afterward, the candidates will resolve it for themselves.
FIFTY-FIVE VOICES, ONE VOTE
Skeptics often assume that an African mandate would require all 55 AU members to agree before every vote, adding a new source of paralysis to a Council already notorious for it. The assumption is legally mistaken. Article 7 of the AU’s Constitutive Act allows the Assembly to decide by a two-thirds majority when consensus fails, and Article 8(13) of the protocol establishing the Peace and Security Council provides the same fallback for substantive decisions. Consensus is Africa’s preferred method, not a rule of unanimity.
The real dangers are political: reluctance to invoke majority rules, unclear delegation, and instructions that arrive after the vote has been taken. Divisions over Western Sahara, the Nile, and conflicts between neighbours make those dangers concrete. In 2011, all three African Council members voted for Resolution 1973 on Libya, days after the AU’s Peace and Security Council had rejected any foreign military intervention and set out a roadmap of its own.
A workable mandate would separate strategy from tactics. The AU Assembly would set common principles; the Peace and Security Council would settle contested positions within its mandate; and ambassadors would negotiate within instructions agreed in advance. For new crises, an emergency procedure must name who decides and by when. If consultation fails, a seat-holder should have bounded authority to act consistently with the Charter and agreed African commitments, followed by a prompt public explanation. Defaulting to abstention would let any outside power neutralize Africa simply by stalling a single capital.
None of this would cure the Council’s paralysis. In 2025, it adopted only 44 resolutions, the fewest since 1991, and just 61 percent of them were unanimous. Two more veto holders would add two more potential sources of obstruction. But a well-designed mandate would make Africa’s positions predictable and its votes harder to pick off, a real asset on the African files that dominate the Council’s enforcement work.
THE VETO AND THE TEST OF RESPONSIBILITY
The veto is where Africa’s claim to equality meets its claim to responsibility. The African position is coherent: it opposes the veto in principle but refuses a permanent tier in which Africans alone lack a privilege the incumbents keep. Washington’s 2024 offer of seats without a veto tested that position, and Africa held it.
Africa can hold it more persuasively. Equal entitlement need not mean unrestricted use. Through the continental compact, African permanent members could commit to explain every veto publicly and never to block credible, Charter-consistent action to prevent or halt genocide, war crimes, or crimes against humanity. The foundation already exists in African law: Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act gives the Union the right to intervene in a member state in precisely those circumstances. Article 4(h) does not itself constrain a UN veto, and a new undertaking would need clear triggers and independent review so that seat-holders cannot write their own escape clauses. But France and the United Kingdom already endorse voluntary veto restraint in mass-atrocity situations; China, Russia, and the United States do not. A binding African commitment would set a standard most of the incumbents have declined to meet and turn Africa’s hardest negotiating point into its strongest moral one.
Africa should also prepare, confidentially, for proposals that would defer or restrict new veto rights, with any departure from the common position reserved to the AU’s competent organs. Examining such contingencies does not concede them. It ensures that the final bargain never confronts the continent with a choice it has not collectively weighed.
Article 24 of the Charter adds a final demand. The Council acts on behalf of all UN members, so African permanent members would carry responsibility for Ukraine, the Middle East, nuclear proliferation, and maritime security, not only for African files. A continental mandate cannot become an instruction to shield African governments regardless of their conduct, any more than permanence licenses the incumbents to shield their allies.
WHAT AFRICA AND ITS PARTNERS SHOULD DO
Africa needs no one’s permission to close its readiness gap. As Africa continues its preparation to take up its permanents seats on the UNSCO, the AU should take at least 3 urgent steps.
First, it should choose the seat design before choosing the candidates. The Assembly should adopt a protocol on African permanent representation, or another binding instrument, that sets out the continental mandate, the decision rules, dispute settlement, and exactly which consequences the AU can lawfully impose, including whether recall would require Charter language.
Second, it should publish selection standards before inviting nominations. Eligibility should require acceptance of the compact, constitutional government, ratification and implementation of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, payment discipline toward both the AU and the UN, and a credible record of compliance with international law. An independent panel should then assess candidates on diplomatic performance, financial sustainability, implementation capacity, and confidence across Africa’s regions, using weights published in advance. Population, GDP, and troop numbers alone should never decide.
Third, it should fund the mandate. Each candidate should present a costed, multiyear plan for its Council mission. The AU should secure a shared support budget, including a pooled team of drafters, sanctions specialists, and lawyers in New York. And member states should deliver their long-promised self-financing commitments, including a credible schedule for reaching the $1 billion Peace Fund target.
Africa’s partners have work to do, too. The governments that have endorsed African permanent seats should say what they mean: whether they would accept an AU role in selection and review, whether they would support Charter language allowing designation and replacement, and where they stand on the veto. Washington, in particular, should clarify whether its 2024 position still stands. Supporters can also act without waiting for Charter reform, by implementing Resolution 2719, which had still not been applied to any mission at the end of 2025. Endorsement without detail allows everyone to claim support for Africa while committing to nothing.
THE SEAT AND THE STANDARD
Africa’s claim to equality is settled. What remains is the question every rising constituency eventually faces: how will authority won in the name of many be exercised by a few? Africa has the experience to sit permanently on the Security Council. Its leaders must now decide who will exercise that authority, how they will act when African interests diverge, and what they will owe the continent and the world once the seats are theirs.
If that work waits until the seats are allocated, the states that win them will help write the limits of their own accountability. For twenty years, Africa has argued that the Council’s rules were written by the powerful, for the powerful. It should not let its own rules be written the same way.
About Integrate Africa Advisory Services
Integrate Africa Advisory Services is a pan-African advisory firm that helps governments, African institutions, and international partners navigate the political, regulatory, and strategic realities of African integration. Based in Johannesburg, we combine high-level African policy, diplomatic, and geopolitical expertise to deliver actionable advice on AU systems, peace and security, governance, economic integration, and institutional engagement.
Author
Dr Remember Miamingi is a co-founder and CEO of Integrate Africa Advisory Services and a former advisor within the Political Affairs, Peace and Security Department of the African Union. Dr Miamingi is a graduate of Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, Osun State, Nigeria, and holds a Master of Laws and Doctor of Laws Degree from the University of Pretoria, Pretoria, South Africa.
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